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Abstract 
 
 
Liquidity is one of the most important factors after credit risk that affects the bond yields. The 
paper uses various measures of liquidity to understand their determinants in Indian sovereign 
bond market. The Liquidity measured by parameters like Turnover Ratio and Amihud Illiquidity 
Indicator show that these parameters not only have instantaneous relationship with bond yield 
but contemporaneous relationship with themselves. Impact Cost is not found to have any 
explanatory power. Financial crisis had marginal impact on the Indian sovereign bond market. It 
functioned well during the crisis period without much deterioration in general market liquidity 
condition as RBI injected large amount of liquidity to the system within a limited time period to 
ensure stability in the financial markets in India. However, the notion of flight to safety was 
evident as traders started investing largely in Government bonds shunning credit products as the 
credit quality in general started to dip. This was duly supported by large issuances of 
Government bonds. The study also finds that the electronic order matching system for 
government bonds has been successful in improving liquidity and reducing volatility in the 
market. 
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 Liquidity Issues in Indian Sovereign Bond Market  
 
Golaka C Nath2 
 
Liquidity is a major issue in bond markets in emerging countries like India. Corporate bond 
markets suffer from higher level of illiquidity vis-à-vis Government bond market in emerging 
market economies. Liquidity may have many different things for interpretation. For financial 
market, we generally define liquidity as the ease of trading a financial product. If the trading 
results in substantial value loss for the asset vis-à-vis its intrinsic value, then we consider the 
market for the security as illiquid. If the price loss is marginal or negligible, we consider the 
market for the product as liquid. There are many measures of liquidity – volume traded, number 
of trades, frequency of trades, bid-ask spread, transaction-by-transaction market impact, etc. 
However, finer liquidity estimation using some of these concepts will require high frequency 
microstructure data that may not be easily available. Hence, we need to use some simple concept 
to measure liquidity over a long period of time.  
 
There are several factors that affect the liquidity – information availability, reliability and quality 
of transaction costs, price impact, and search costs, among others. Liquidity affects the asset 
prices as investors would require additional compensation to have the inventory of the illiquid 
assets which have higher transaction cost vis-à-vis a liquid asset. Amihud and Mendelson (1986, 
1989) have demonstrated that lower liquidity in assets resulted in significantly higher average 
returns, after controlling for risk and other factors. 
 
The current study examines the liquidity of the Government securities market in India. The 
Government securities market is viewed as one of the most important financial market as it links 
economic activity to interest rate. Central banks use the market to perform domestic monetary 
operations like infusing liquidity to the system or absorbing excess liquidity in the system 
through Repo windows or Open Market Operations (OMO). They use the market to extract 
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information on forward interest rates and inflation expectations. The market also provides 
benchmarks to the traders to use it for corporate credit.  Liquidity of this market is important to 
all stake holders. The market liquidity has an impact on a central bank’s policy making 
specifically when the central bank has additional responsibility of ensuring the smooth 
borrowing programme for the Government. There are three distinct channels through which we 
can study this impact. (a) Liquidity has an impact on monetary policy formulation of the central 
bank as the decision to follow a tight or easy monetary policy depends on the available liquidity 
in the system. Financial asset price information (Bond prices) provide valuable clue not only on 
current market condition, they also provide vital information on future monetary conditions and 
hence this can be used in the formulation and implementation of monetary policy by the central 
bank. Market liquidity affects price of assets as illiquid securities add significant cost of holding 
an asset inventory to its price. As liquidity has cost, its gets built into the price. Liquidity 
condition in the market also affects the transmission of monetary policy actions. Central Banks 
conduct OMO to easy liquidity condition in the market so that the interest rate is moderated to 
targeted levels. Market liquidity has a more direct impact on monetary policy implementation. 
(b) Market liquidity may at times cause systemic disruption and put pressure on Governments 
and central banks to act. Financial crisis of 2007-09 was accentuated more due to tight market 
liquidity as funds dried up in the market and many firms had to face liquidation as they did not 
have sufficient liquidity options to survive the tight condition. Depending on the level of market 
liquidity, at times, liquidity issues give rise to solvency problems at key financial intermediaries. 
The liquidity problems can lead to systemic failure in payment systems (liquidity risk) and lead 
to the collapse in credit allocation. During recent financial crisis, most of the central banks 
around the world worked overtime to inject liquidity to the financial system through banking and 
near-banking channels to avoid systemic payment collapse. Hence, insufficient market liquidity 
will have resultant impact on a central bank’s activities both as a lender of last resort and in its 
supervision of financial stability. An inadequate liquidity situation may lead to inaccurate 
estimation of market risk and may create disruption in the market discipline posing serious 
challenge to the central bank’s ability to supervise through prudential regulation. (c) In the 
aftermath of financial crisis, it was observed that most of the Governments around the world 
have very high level of outstanding debt because of their support to the financial system during 
the crisis and after. A liquid secondary market results in lower borrowing cost for the 
Governments. A central bank would always work in close coordination with the Government to 
enhance the integrity and efficiency of the Government securities market. Central banks around 
the world released funds to the monetary system by following easy monetary policy regimes so 
that transmission effect results in smooth credit and market risk environment and to obviate 
bankruptcy issues. Most of the central banks used bond buying programmes to pump liquidity to 
support the market. 
 
A market is liquid if traders can execute their trades immediately, and where large deals have 
little impact on current and subsequent prices or bid-ask spreads. The market liquidity is better 
explained over four dimensions: immediacy, depth, width (bid-ask spread), and resiliency. All 
these dimensions of liquidity interact with each other and makes market liquidity a complex 
issue. A market is generally considered to be liquid if it is possible for a trader to sell or buy 
large amounts of securities in a minimum number of transactions with little impact on prices. 
Gravelle (1999a) explained liquidity according to four dimensions: (a) immediacy, or the speed 
of doing a transaction; (b) depth, which refers to the maximum amount of a security which can 
be traded at a given price; (c) width, or the bid-ask spread3, which is the cost of accessing 
liquidity indicating a wider spread means lower liquidity; and (d) resiliency, which captures how 
fast prices revert to their equilibrium after a transaction. 
 
Price impact explains the depth of the market. In a liquid market, large quantities of securities 
can be traded without affecting the price. But in many markets – specifically in emerging 
markets, it might be difficult to find a counterparty who  is willing to buy or sell a specific 
security and the holder of the bond need to provide higher capital to maintain the inventory. The 
liquidity of a specific bond may affect the price. If the investor wants an immediate execution of 
a sell order, he will have either to sell at a discount, or take the risk of waiting to realize the 
price. Liquidity is an important determinant of bond yield and returns. The liquidity component 
of bonds can explain a larger fraction of the yield than the default component itself. The size and 
the turnover volume of the secondary market affect the liquidity of the bonds. If a market has 
sufficient buyers and sellers to facilitate trading of a bond, its ability to respond to market events 
is higher. Illiquid bonds respond less quickly to market events due to low depth and hence they 
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are more likely to see wide swings in prices. The traders will penalize higher volatility and 
demand high yield which will be reflected in the bond’s price. 
 
Liquidity in the bond market can be enhanced in a market with improvement in market’s 
institutional structures by introduction of electronic dealing platforms, improving the depth of 
the market by bringing in new participants like Primary Dealers along with market making 
mechanism, improved disclosure standards, tax factors including withholding taxes, increasing 
floating stocks in the market, providing hedging instruments for risk management like 
derivatives, well-functioning clearing and settlement systems, introduction of STRIPS Program 
for government securities, Open Market Operations by the Central Bank, structured buyback 
programmes, regular re-opening of issues to ensure availability of comfortable level of floating 
stocks, etc. Size indicators like transaction volumes cannot be used as reliable liquidity measure 
as it does not capture any age-induced declines in liquidity. In many markets, introduction of 
electronic platforms have provided ease in trading and have helped in reducing cost of trading. In 
India, the experiment with the NDS-OM4 trading system for Government bonds has paid rich 
dividend for all stake holders. However, market participants still preferred using conventional 
trading channel for off-the-run bonds and other sovereign securities like T-bills and State 
Development Loans5 (SDL) even though NDS-OM provides better electronic order book 
options. In most countries, liquid secondary markets are based on the following cornerstones: (i) 
higher incidence of issuance in critical tenors like benchmark points; (ii) well-functioning repo 
and short sell markets; (iii) well-functioning derivatives (both OTC and exchange traded) 
markets to hedge risks; (iv) facilitating price discovery mechanism; and (v) supporting a network 
of primary dealers.  
 
The concept of liquidity is complex, although empirically, a single dimension such the ability to 
trade a security with minimal impact on its price is considered while measuring liquidity in 
quantitative terms. The liquidity in Indian Government bond market could be enhanced to some 
extent in recent years by using the key building-blocks like: (i) sound institutions and macro 
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policies; (ii) an efficient and robust infrastructure; (iii) a well-functioning repo market; (iv) 
adequate information flows; and (v) a diversified investor base including facilitating foreign 
investment in Government bonds.  
 
Indian Treasury bond market has gone through major changes during last one decade or so. 
Introduction of primary dealer system, well-structured auction mechanism with auction calendar, 
structured clearing and settlement mechanism with CCP6 provisions, availability of OTC Rupee 
derivatives products, anonymous trading platform like NDS-OM providing efficient price 
discovery, well developed repo and repo-variant market7, provisions of short selling, etc. have 
been instrumental in improving the market microstructure in Indian Government bond market. 
The Government bond market is a unique experiment with enabling provisions for execution of 
trades using brokers, directly talking to a counter party over telephone and online anonymous 
order matching mechanism.  
 
The present paper makes an attempt to understand the issues related to liquidity behavior of 
Indian Government securities market as well as tries to find out how various indicators of 
liquidity is used in the market. It also tries to understand how realistically the liquidity indicators 
are used in the market and what factors are considered as determinants of the liquidity indicators. 
The paper is arranged into following – Section 1 deals with Indian market microstructure; 
Section 2 discusses some stylized facts; Section 3 deals in liquidity measurement and 
determinants; Section 4 deals with volatilities and Section 5 gives concluding remarks. 
 
Indian Market Microstructure 
 
Indian bond market is dominated by Government securities – in both primary and secondary 
markets. Government bond market includes the securities issued not only by the Government of 
India8 but also the securities issued by various federal States. The primary market auctions for 
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both Government securities and Treasury Bills are conducted through electronic auction system 
and the said system also facilitates “When Issued Market”.  
 
Table – 1: Snapshot of the Indian Government Securities Market 
  M92009 M2010 M2011 M2012 M2013 
No. of Outstanding stock 132 128 122 121 118 
Outstanding stock (` In billion) 17,061 20,335 23,500 27,830 32,445 
Outstanding stock as ratio of GDP (%)* 38.63 42.44 44.37 49.42 56.28 
Turnover/GDP (%)* 468.66 628.68 418.02 391.23 629.64 
Average maturity of the securities issued during the year (Years) 13.82 11.17 11.63 12.67 13.60 
Weighted average cost of the securities issued during the year (%) 7.69 7.23 7.91 8.52 8.36 
Minimum and maximum maturities of stock issued during the year (Years) 4 - 30 2 - 30 2 - 30 5 - 30 4 - 30 
PD's share in the Outright turnover - Secondary Market 18.77 15.84 18.98 26.35 17.22 
Transactions on CCIL (Face value ` In billion)# 62,545 89,867 69,702 72,521 119,948 
Turnover Ratio (%) 0.9606 0.6188 0.6450  0.6641 1.7881 
10-Year Yield (%)@ 7.01 7.79 7.98 8.53 7.96 
Outstanding Treasury Bills (` In billion) 1,503 1,375 1,413 2,670 2,998 
Issuances of Cash Management Bills (` In billion) - - 120 930 - 
91 Day T-bill cut-off Yield (%)$ 4.95 4.38 7.31 9.02 8.19 
Notes: * - GDP at market price (at 2004-05 prices). Q4 of 2012-13 is the approximation of Q3 with 5% p.a. GDP growth. 
               # - Transaction on CCIL comprises of total outright and repo value settled. 
              @ - Last trading day of the financial year. 
              $ - Last Auction of the financial year. Turnover ratio is daily average trades volume divided by Face Value outstanding for Gilts 
Source: CCIL 
 
During last few years, Government of India has been steadily increasing its market borrowing 
and funds almost 90% of its fiscal deficit through such market borrowings. In FY2011-12, large 
amount were raised by issuing T-bills of various durations. During FY2011-11 and FY2011-12, 
some Cash Management Bills10 were also issued to raise funds from the system. As these large 
borrowings have put pressure in the market liquidity, RBI has to resort to Open Market 
Operations (OMO) on various occasions to infuse liquidity to the system. This liquidity infusion 
is in addition to the daily LAF Repo conducted by RBI to moderate money supply in the system. 
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Table -2: Government Borrowing Details (` Crore11) 
FY 
G-Sec SDL T-Bill 
Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net 
2007-08 194050 146112 67779 56224 314496 -33155 
2008-09 277000 219302 118138 103766 360912 31827 
2009-10 428306 327369 131122 114883 385875 -13274 
2010-11 437000 322677 104039 88398 343765 327 
2011-12 510000 426025 158632 136643 630813 132193 
2012-13 558000 467384 177279 146657 802830 32743 
Source: CCIL 
 
The high borrowing level has to be managed by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) through 
uniform price based auctions as well as through infusion of liquidity to the system. The liquidity 
shortage has been continuing for a long time in India (since July’10) and this has resulted in RBI 
injecting good amount of liquidity to the system using daily LAF. On many occasions, OMOs 
have to be conducted just before the auctions for Government securities. This has helped to 
ensure smooth sailing of auctions as well as helping to moderate yield. 
 
Unlike US and other developed markets, Government bond market in India is a wholesale 
market with very little or negligible participation from retail investors. The secondary market 
microstructure underwent dramatic change after introduction of NDS-OM system which 
facilitated anonymous trading in Government bonds like equities with an efficient price 
discovery mechanism but without any intermediary. Brokers or intermediaries which facilitated 
about 80% of the trading before introduction of NDS-OM system in Aug 2005 did not have 
access to the new system as the new system was owned by Reserve Bank of India and directly 
allows traders to trade accessing large market provided they have Constituent Gilts Accounts12. 
The web-based application within NDS-OM system allows direct market access to constituents 
to trade in the wholesale institutional market with efficient price discovery. The participants had 
three options to choose: (a) directly negotiating with each other for a deal; (b) taking the help of 
a broker to identify the counter party to trade a security; (c) directly becoming a member of the 
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new order driven system which was STP13 enabled from the start. However, the new system 
captured about 60% of the market immediately after its introduction. The market share of the 
new trading system is steady at about 80%. Broking companies have very little role with about 
8% market share.  
 
The new trading system, NDS-OM, provided higher liquidity to the system with an active order 
book management system and efficiency in price discovery. The traders could see the depth of 
the market anytime with buy and sell orders coming to the system with time stamp. Proprietary 
deals by Banks and Institutions accounted for about 87% in terms of value (90% in terms of 
number of deals). Participation in trading was also linked to a bank’s total holding of 
Government securities. Typically a major part of a bank’s holding of Government securities is in 
Held to Maturity (HTM) category as banks are allowed to put a part of the security (currently 
upto 23% of the Net Demand and Term Liabilities (NDTL) which is exactly equal to the 
Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR)) in the said category which does not envisage any provision for 
mark-to-market losses as it is expected to be held till its redemption. The remaining part of the 
securities holding balance can be held in Available for Sale or Held for Trading which will 
require regular provisioning and mark-to-market.  
Table – 3: Descriptive Statistics of Indian Government Bond Market 
Year 
Volume Amount in ` crores14 3 Months Yield (%) 10 Year Yield (%) Spread % 
(10Y – 
3M) 
No of 
trades Volume  
Avg. 
Trades 
Avg. 
Volume Average Minimum Maximum Average Minimum Maximum 
2002-03 191,843 1,076,147 646 3,623 5.9813 5.1917 8.0806 7.0501 5.8493 8.4697 1.0687 
2003-04 243,585 1,575,133 820 5,303 5.0302 4.3606 6.9191 5.6381 5.1037 6.4264 0.6080 
2004-05 160,682 1,134,222 550 3,884 4.9433 4.2186 6.0219 6.4411 5.2346 7.3300 1.4979 
2005-06 125,509 864,751 467 3,215 5.4102 4.8806 6.4624 7.2099 6.8800 7.5500 1.7998 
2006-07 137,100 1,021,536 562 4,187 6.2781 5.1527 7.3844 7.8410 7.3685 8.4699 1.5629 
2007-08 188,843 1,653,851 765 6,696 6.6016 5.1327 7.5067 7.9436 7.3880 8.3657 1.3419 
2008-09 245,964 2,160,233 1,047 9,192 6.6021 3.7268 8.8655 7.8347 5.5200 9.4591 1.2326 
2009-10 316,956 2,913,890 1,332 12,243 3.2285 2.0748 5.7952 7.7447 6.7102 8.2553 4.5162 
2010-11 332,540 2,870,952 1,346 11,623 5.7268 3.1328 6.9313 8.0827 7.7530 8.3197 2.3559 
2011-12 412,266 3,488,203 1,732 14,656 8.1514 6.6040 8.9539 8.3410 8.0600 8.9300 0.1896 
2012-13 658055 6,592,032 2731 27353 8.0608 7.8055 8.6757 8.1543 7.7924 8.5600 0.0935 
Source: CCIL 
 
Banks alone account for about 72%15 of total trading in Government securities while Primary 
Dealers account for about 17% of trading and other Institutions like Mutual Funds and Insurance 
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reported by selling Bank to the RBI and Broker has also to report the same deal to the Stock Exchange. 
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companies account for about 9% of trading. Indian Government bond market is divided into two 
distinct systems – (i) an anonymous order driven system (NDS-OM) introduced in Aug 2005 and 
(ii) a trade reporting system where trades are executed over phone by market participants and 
then reported to the central server managed by Reserve Bank of India (RBI) within a particular 
time frame (30 minutes)16. Market participants, mainly institutions, are free to choose any of the 
above two systems for their deals in Government securities and T-bills. The NDS-OM system 
contributes a significant part of the market transactions in number of deals as well in terms of 
value of deals and has established itself as the most preferred platform for executing trades.  
Table 4: Market Share of Trading Platforms  
   Trades in NDS (%) Value in NDS (%)  Trades in NDS-OM (%) Trades in NDS-OM(%) 
2005-06 50.36 56.98 49.64 43.02 
2006-07 25.79 36.11 74.21 63.89 
2007-08 16.43 27.42 83.57 72.58 
2008-09 14.35 28.36 85.65 71.64 
2009-10 12.87 27.41 87.13 72.59 
2010-11 12.85 21.73 87.15 78.27 
2011-12 10.89 20.96 89.11 79.04 
2012-13 8.79 17.91 91.21 82.09 
Source: CCIL 
 
Some Stylized Facts 
Liquidity Infusion 
Liquidity in the market depends on many factors. The most important issue in liquidity is the 
support from the central bank to the banking system to access liquidity from the monetary 
system. RBI uses daily Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF) to moderate money supply in the 
system – if the banking system has excess liquidity, it can be parked at the central bank with a 
fixed return using policy reverse repo rate through LAF and if the banking system faces shortage 
of liquidity, RBI injects liquidity to the system using a fixed policy repo rate through LAF. In 
case the bank is not able to cover its position and still faces shortage, RBI supports the bank with 
a Marginal Standing Facility using a special LAF window at the end of the business day. The net 
LAF indicates the liquidity condition in the market. During financial crisis period, we find that 
liquidity shortage in the market resulted in RBI injecting funds to the system in mid-2008 and in 
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Sep-Oct’08, the shortage was more than 1% of the NDTL. Further, in order to fight the effect of 
the financial crisis, RBI reduced the policy Repo Rate on multiple occasions, reduced CRR and 
SLR and infused liquidity in the system. This substantial injection of liquidity resulted in excess 
funds with the banking system as credit delivery started sinking due to the crisis. Banks started 
parking these excess funds with RBI at policy reverse repo rate. The liquidity infusion helped the 
market to increase their participation in bond market as interest rate started dipping due to 
infusion of huge liquidity to the system coupled with reduction in policy rates and drop in credit 
delivery.  
Table 5: Actual/Potential Release of Primary Liquidity  
(since mid-September 2008 (till Mar 2009)) 
Measure/Facility Amount (`. Crore) 
Monetary Policy Operations (1 to 3)   
1. Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) Reduction 1,60,000 
2.Open Market Operations 68,835 
3. MSS Unwinding/De-sequestering 97,781 
Extension of Liquidity Facilities (4 to 8)   
4. Term Repo Facility 60,000 
5. Increase in Export Credit Refinance 25,512 
6. Special Refinance Facility for SCBs (Non-RRB) 38,500 
7. Refinance Facility for SIDBI/NHB/EXIM Bank 16,000 
8. Liquidity Facility for NBFCs through SPV 25,000 
Total (1 to 8) 4,91,628 
Memo:   
Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) Reduction 40,000 
Source: RBI 
The liquidity infusion also helps banking system to invest in bonds thereby increasing the bond 
turnover in the market. Since mid-2010, Indian market is going through a tight liquidity 
condition for which RBI has been injecting liquidity through LAF repo window and occasional 
OMO. The proactive policy initiatives were taken by RBI to avoid contraction of the RBI 
balance sheet and the same aimed at ensuring non-inflationary growth of money supply in the 
economy to support the needs of the real economy. This resulted in stabilizing the bond turnover.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: LAF Support as a percentage of NDTL 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
LAF  0.92% 0.90% 0.10% -0.11% 2.23% -0.13% -1.12% -1.44% -1.49% 
TR17 0.53 0.63 0.70 1.05 1.22 0.97 0.84 1.30 2.34 
Source: CCIL, RBI 
 
Trading Activity 
Though there are large numbers of securities (there are 110 securities including special securities 
but excluding floating rate bonds as on March’13) extending maturity upto 30 years issued by 
the Government and available for trading in the market, trading is concentrated on few securities. 
Indian Government bond market faces high concentration in benchmark securities like 10-year 
and 5-year maturities. Though there are large number of securities issued by the Government, 
trading in 10 securities constitute about 95% of the trading in terms of value. Hence most of the 
securities are relatively illiquid. Trading level in the market is also sensitive to the net LAF level. 
The correlation between Net LAF and Trading volume is -0.39. There is liquidity concentration 
in few securities like 10-year benchmark. The concentration of liquidity in few securities has 
increased in recent years.  
 
Table -7:  Liquidity Concentration (in %) 
  Top 5 Top 10 
2003-04 39.01 57.30 
2004-05 49.97 66.31 
2005-06 63.75 82.82 
2006-07 74.88 88.82 
2007-08 66.35 83.84 
2008-09 61.07 73.89 
2009-10 60.71 79.08 
2010-11 71.77 88.03 
2011-12 85.51 94.15 
2012-13 77.05 95.05 
Source: CCIL 
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Value of Issuance. 
Trading concentration in benchmark securities has been hallmark of the Indian Government 
securities market. After the financial crisis, market interest in long term bonds have come down 
significantly.  
Table – 8: Maturity Bucket Trading Distribution     
Category M2003 M2004 M2005 M2006 M2007 M2008 M2009 M2010 M2011 M2012 M2013 Current 
upto 5 Years 7.08 9.07 23.64 26.44 27.68 22.81 19.46 27.15 19.57 3.49 6.81 15.29 
5 to 10 Years 54.42 36.75 45.05 29.10 58.61 53.08 54.43 59.07 39.68 75.19 41.22 34.95 
10 to 20 Years 35.54 52.53 29.35 39.78 4.62 8.88 13.69 11.58 39.20 20.34 49.81 48.53 
20 to 30 Years 2.96 1.65 1.95 4.68 9.09 15.24 12.41 2.21 1.55 0.98 2.16 1.22 
Source: CCIL 
 
Liquidity Measurement and Determinants 
Turnover Ratio 
Bond Market liquidity can be measured by Bonds Turnover Ratio (TR). The ratio shows the 
extent of daily trading volume in the secondary market (buy and sell) relative to the amount of 
bonds outstanding measured in terms of Face Value. This ratio is computed for securities using 
only outright purchases / sales and excludes repo / repurchases transactions. A secondary market 
is said to be active when the TR is high.  
Table – 9: Turnover Ratio & Yield 
Parameters Yield % TR 
Mean 7.8898 0.9609 
Standard Error 0.0522 0.0487 
Median 7.9998 0.8521 
Standard Deviation 0.5117 0.4769 
Sample Variance 0.2619 0.2274 
Kurtosis 1.1708 1.8226 
Skewness -0.6058 1.2057 
Range 3.0312 2.5342 
Minimum 6.2265 0.3017 
Maximum 9.2577 2.8358 
Count 96 96 
Source: CCIL 
 
TR can be used as a relative measure to understand liquidity. The same widely varies among 
securities. For some of the on-the-run treasuries, the TR is very high as concentration of trading 
is observed in those securities while in some securities the TR is very low as these securities are 
typically held in the books of the banks under “Held Till Maturity” category investment. 
Typically TR will be high when market liquidity is high. High market liquidity indicates lower 
interest rate scenario prevailing at that point in time (in relative term). TR is a very important and 
useful proxy for liquidity in the market. When interest rate level is lower, it encourages traders to 
build positions. At higher interest rate, traders do not want to keep high inventory of stocks and 
hence trading volumes takes a dip.  
 
In India, TR and 10 year yield (monthly changes) are observed to have a negative correlation of 
0.43 with each other indicating higher TR means lower Yield.  
Table – 10: Simple Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Sum Minimum Maximum 
DY 94 0.0069 0.2458 0.6505 -1.2167 0.7714 
DTR 94 0.0197 0.4067 1.8500 -0.7500 1.51 
 
Chart - 1: Scatter Plot - Yield and Turnover Ratio (Monthly Changes) 
 
 
 
The Pearson Correlation (after Fisher’s z transformation) between Yield and TR works out to be 
-0.43 and statistically significant.  
 
 
 Table –11: Pearson Correlation Statistics (Fisher's z Transformation) 
Variable With 
Variable 
N Sample 
Correlation 
Fisher's z Bias 
Adjustment 
Correlation 
Estimate 
95% Confidence 
Limits 
p Value for 
H0:Rho=0 
DY DTR 94 -0.4346 -0.4656 -0.0023 -0.4327 -0.5841 -0.2522 <.0001 
Spearman Correlation Statistics (Fisher's z Transformation) 
Variable With 
Variable 
N Sample 
Correlation 
Fisher's z Bias 
Adjustment 
Correlation 
Estimate 
95% Confidence 
Limits 
p Value for 
H0:Rho=0 
DY DTR 94 -0.4062 -0.4311 -0.0022 -0.4044 -0.5610 -0.2198 <.0001 
 
Graphically they follow a close trend. During financial crisis, there was substantial drop in TR. 
In order to understand the true relation between TR and Yield, we fitted a simple model using the 
TR and Yield (monthly changes). The regression R-sq was 0.19.   The linearly fitted model 
showed that Yield and TR have statistically significant relationship. We re-specified the model 
with inclusion of the lagged yields as additional variables and found that the R-sq improved to 
0.38.  
 
Table – 9: Parameter Estimates 
Variable DF Estimate Standard t Value Approx 
Error Pr > |t| 
Intercept 1 0.0198 0.0343 0.58 0.5658 
DY 1 -1.0121* 0.1536 -6.59 <.0001 
Lag 1 DY 1 0.789* 0.1639 4.81 <.0001 
Lag 2 DY 1 -0.0158 0.1534 -0.1 0.918 
R-Sq – 0.38, DW – 2.61 RMSE – 0.3282, * - significant at 1%  
 
Since most of the time series data has an autoregressive structure, we re-specified the regression 
model with inclusion of lagged variables of the TR in the equation upto 5 lags18 along with the 
yields and lagged yields. 
 
𝑇𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐷𝑌1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐷𝑌2 + 𝛾1 ∗ 𝐿𝑇𝑅1 + 𝛾2 ∗ 𝐿𝑇𝑅2 +  𝛾3 ∗ 𝐿𝑇𝑅3 + 𝛾4 ∗ 𝐿𝑇𝑅4 + 𝛾5 ∗ 𝐿𝑇𝑅5 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
 
 
 
      
                                                          
18 With only lagged variables of TR, the R-Sq was 0.22 and DW stat was 2.04. 
Table – 10: Parameter Estimates 
Variable DF Estimate Standard t Value Approx 
Error Pr > |t| 
Intercept 1 0.0475 0.032 1.48 0.1420 
DY 1 -1.0343* 0.1449 -7.14 <.0001 
LY 1 0.2002 0.1879 1.07 0.2900 
LTR1 1 -0.5218* 0.1105 -4.72 <.0001 
LTR2 1 -0.4858* 0.122 -3.98 0.0001 
LTR3 1 -0.2797** 0.1154 -2.42 0.0176 
LTR4 1 -0.2267 0.1018 -2.23 0.0287 
LTR5 1 -0.0554 0.0983 -0.56 0.5749 
R-Sq – 0.53, DW – 1.9919 RMSE – 0.2965 * - significant at 1% and ** - significant at 5%  
 
The estimated equation shows that TR has a long memory and it gets influenced by lagged 
values of TR upto 4 months though lag 3 and 4 are week and statistically significant only at 5% 
level. It also showed that lagged yield is not statistically significant. We re-estimated the model 
with these lagged variables (OLS). The signs of the estimated equation show clearly that change 
in liquidity measured by TR is negatively related to the level of Yield and positively to previous 
months’ TR. We also tried to re-estimate the model with an autoregressive process using only 4 
lagged values of TR and DY. 
Table – 11: Parameter Estimates 
Variable DF Estimate Standard t Value Approx 
Error Pr > |t| 
Intercept 1 0.0494 0.0313 1.58 0.1181 
DY 1 -0.9911* 0.1351 -7.34 <.0001 
LTR1 1 -0.5825* 0.0900 -6.47 <.0001 
LTR2 1 -0.5435* 0.0942 -5.77 <.0001 
LTR3 1 -0.2964* 0.0956 -3.10 0.0026 
LTR4 1 -0.2172** 0.0934 -2.33 0.0224 
R-Sq – 0.52, Durbin h – 1.1120 RMSE – 0.2948 * - significant at 1% and ** - significant at 5%   
   
The total R-Sq statistic computed from the above autoregressive model is 0.52. The Regression 
R-Sq was the R-Sq statistic for a regression of transformed variables adjusted for the estimated 
autocorrelation. The parameter estimates gives the Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates of the 
                                                          
19 Since lagged values are included in the equation, DW stat is not strictly valid. 
20 Since lagged values are included in the equation, DW stat is not strictly valid. Durbin h is used to test for first-
order autocorrelation 
regression coefficients. The fitted model shows that turnover ratio has contemporaneous 
relationship with its own lagged information but has an instantaneous relationship with the yield. 
 
Amihud Illiquidity Indicator 
 
Amihud (2002) measured illiquidity of the stock using a measure called ILLIQ which is the daily 
ratio of absolute price change to its value traded. This is interpreted as the daily price response 
linked to trading value. This ratio works as a good measure for estimating price impact. There 
are other measures of liquidity but some of such measures will require high frequency 
microstructure data (e.g. for calculating bid-ask spread). The measure proposed by Amihud can 
be easily constructed with usual available data of daily prices for a longer period to test the 
effects over time of illiquidity on ex-ante and contemporaneous bond returns. This illiquidity 
measure can be linked with other simple measures of illiquidity. Amihud found that both across 
stocks and over time (for NYSE during 1964-1997), expected returns are an increasing function 
of expected liquidity. He found that ILLIQ has a positive and highly significant effect on 
expected returns. He found that higher realized illiquidity raises expected illiquidity that in turn 
raises expected returns. 
 
Following Amihud, bond illiquidity is defined in this paper as the ratio of daily absolute return to 
the trading value on that day. Daily absolute return is calculated by taking the difference between 
closing price and opening price of the bonds. Since there are two distinct platforms for doing   
and/or recording a transaction in India, NDS-OM platform dominates with large market share. 
Though same security can be traded either in OTC market and gets reported in NDS system or it 
can be anonymously traded in NDS-OM system, it is necessary to adjust the scale factor (trading 
multiple) in ILLIQ ratio computed for NDS system vis-à-vis NDS-OM system. Since NDS-OM 
market is visible to all traders in the market on almost real time basis, deals in OTC market may 
be executed by dealers after comparing the price/yield in NDS-OM system. In order to have 
better understanding of the liquidity dynamics in Indian Government securities market, we 
divided the securities into three categories in terms of their number of deals in a day. If the 
number of deals exceeds 15 in a day, it is considered as “Liquid”, if the number of deals exceeds 
5, then it is considered as “Semi-Liquid”, otherwise “Illiquid”. We dropped all trades where 
High and Low prices are same – all deals are considered as “special” and might have taken place 
at the same price. These deals may be the ones which are executed by the same dealers (at least 
in one side of the deal) and hence executed at a single price. We constituted our dataset with 
securities that have at least 3 trades in a day and dropped all non-market lot deals (below 
50million). However, the Amihud ILLIQ ratio that was computed for NDS are scaled (adjusted) 
using the trading value ratio (the ratio of value of deals in NDS-OM and NDS). This scaling is 
absolutely necessary to make them comparable in terms of their liquidity parameters. After 
scaling the ILLIQ ratio, both NDS and NDS-OM became comparable for analysis. It is observed 
that the scaling factor is less than 1 for semi-liquid and illiquid securities while for liquid 
securities, the scaling factor is greater than one and very high. The Amihud ratio has been 
multiplied by 10^7 for reporting results. 
Table – 12: Trading Distribution in OTC and Anonymous Platform  
Year Source Category Deals Value21 Source Deals Value 
Scaling 
Factor 
2005 NDS ILLIQUID 3459 44412.34 OM 604 4425.00 0.0996 
2005 NDS LIQUID 13452 79334.68 OM 24360 133705.00 1.6853 
2005 NDS SEMI_LIQUID 4555 39817.98 OM 2346 14180.00 0.3561 
2006 NDS ILLIQUID 5457 71022.23 OM 1480 13720.00 0.1932 
2006 NDS LIQUID 14471 120452.60 OM 84230 522620.00 4.3388 
2006 NDS SEMI_LIQUID 8867 98480.36 OM 3794 27180.00 0.2760 
2007 NDS ILLIQUID 5249 90348.80 OM 1947 25811.07 0.2857 
2007 NDS LIQUID 7035 83365.54 OM 110730 767485.68 9.2063 
2007 NDS SEMI_LIQUID 8458 130414.45 OM 5623 53554.54 0.4106 
2008 NDS ILLIQUID 5355 117714.34 OM 2523 30098.43 0.2557 
2008 NDS LIQUID 11257 143203.63 OM 196821 1404082.05 9.8048 
2008 NDS SEMI_LIQUID 8355 151571.20 OM 7036 71675.78 0.4729 
2009 NDS ILLIQUID 6905 173391.08 OM 4811 77428.08 0.4466 
2009 NDS LIQUID 14059 241654.98 OM 262454 1889383.22 7.8185 
2009 NDS SEMI_LIQUID 11367 222748.96 OM 10384 124597.36 0.5594 
2010 NDS ILLIQUID 5197 111477.47 OM 3868 65120.65 0.5842 
2010 NDS LIQUID 18321 230024.97 OM 272050 2043296.97 8.8829 
2010 NDS SEMI_LIQUID 10082 164706.65 OM 7182 95861.22 0.5820 
2011 NDS ILLIQUID 4724 90192.21 OM 2939 42877.10 0.4754 
2011 NDS LIQUID 18681 253828.72 OM 300355 2137379.45 8.4206 
2011 NDS SEMI_LIQUID 9544 141557.70 OM 6185 75121.81 0.5307 
2012 NDS ILLIQUID 6994 132035.65 OM 5264 79485.50 0.6020 
                                                          
21 All Values in `Crores (10 million Indian Rupees) 
2012 NDS LIQUID 25284 542747.61 OM 483858 3917165.57 7.2173 
2012 NDS SEMI_LIQUID 12573 180700.67 OM 11721 145392.90 0.8046 
2013 NDS ILLIQUID 515 7586.96 OM 454 5084.82 0.6702 
2013 NDS LIQUID 1807 64350.82 OM 52294 494768.69 7.6886 
2013 NDS SEMI_LIQUID 1106 14799.74 OM 473 4431.07 0.2994 
 
This scaling factors for illiquid and semi-liquid securities show that market participants prefer 
OTC market to negotiate the deals rather than going for the anonymous order driven market for 
these securities. NDS-OM has helped to create an efficient market for liquid securities with 
much finer pricing but for illiquid and semi-liquid securities, the dealers and their constituents 
must know the counter-parties who may be willing to trade a security. 
 
Once we constructed the daily Amihud ILLIQ factor for all securities for our dataset consisting 
of trades from Jan’03 to Feb’13. The NDS-OM data had clear open and close prices as per the 
time of transaction while NDS data (both pre and post -NDSOM period) had information on time 
of receipt of the trade information by the server. As all traders are required to report their deals 
within a particular time to the central server, we assumed the arrival time at the server as the 
basis of opening and closing deal times. The NDS-OM system brought higher level of 
transparency to the market. In an OTC environment, information on market activity played very 
important role and smaller entities had very little bargaining power when striking a deal. These 
smaller entities depended heavily on the wisdom of brokers and other large traders. NDS-OM 
provided information of securities and the market activity on real time basis to all. Hence, 
trading securities become easier with people taking view on interest rate scenario rather than 
following their peers’ activity in the market. Before starting of NDS-OM, the level of illiquidity 
was higher in 2003 and 2004. The same dropped almost 50% in 2005 and further in 2006. The 
onset of financial crisis brought the issue of market illiquidity into the forefront. In 2007, the 
Amihud illiquidity factor increased vis-à-vis 2006 but the same went up drastically (almost 
doubled) in 2008 and 2009 as the market was engulfed with high level of illiquidity. However, 
aftermath of the crisis saw large amount of liquidity being pumped to the system by central 
banks around the world. This increased the market liquidity in general. The market witnessed 
higher level of liquidity which resulted in drop in Amihud illiquidity factor as can be seen in the 
Chart (2010 onwards). The study clearly shows that the introduction of NDS-OM helped in 
reducing illiquidity in the market significantly. The market has improved in terms of all 
parameters. The volatility has come down and liquidity has improved as Amihud ILLIQ factor 
shows a significant drop. 
 
Table – 13: Amihud Illiquidity Indicator 
Period Days ILLIQ STDEV MAX MIN 
PREOM 756 0.00230 0.00259 0.02736 0.00006 
POSTOM 1850 0.00159 0.00181 0.02353 0.00006 
 
The Amihud ILLIQ indicator was aggregated for month specific analysis. The data very clearly 
indicates that the Amihud ILLIQ was very high during financial crisis period and soon after as 
liquidity dried up. However, the liquidity has improved considerably in recent months. 
 
 
 
Amihud ILLIQ indicator was very high during financial crisis period indicating increasing 
illiquidity in the market.  
Table – 14: Descriptive Statistics for Amihud Illiquidity Indicator (Apr’03 – Feb’13)  
Mean 0.001776 
Standard Error 0.000105 
Median 0.001501 
Standard Deviation 0.001143 
Sample Variance 1.31E-06 
Kurtosis 10.49757 
Skewness 2.736135 
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Chart - 2: Amihud Illiquidity Indicator
Series1
Range 0.007697 
Minimum 0.000538 
Maximum 0.008235 
Monthly Observations 119 
  
Year-wise analysis also indicates the drop in illiquidity after introduction of NDS-OM. As the 
liquidity improved due to introduction of NDS-OM, this must have resulted in savings for all 
market participants.  
  
 
 
We wanted to test if there was any structural change in liquidity indicator after introduction on 
NDSOM system and used the Chow test for testing the said information for a data period of 122 
months (Jan’03 to Feb’13). The Aug’05 is the 32nd data point for which structural break is tested. 
We included change in yield and the lagged values of Amihud ILLIQ in the equation to test for 
structural break significance.  
 
Table – 15: Structural Change Test 
Test Break Point Num DF Den DF F Value Pr > F 
Chow 32 4 113 7.8 <.0001 
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Chart - 3: AMIHUD IllIQUIDITY 
AMIHUD ILLIQUIDITY FACTOR
The Chow test very clearly indicated that there is a strong indication of structural break for data 
point no. 32 (introduction of NDSOM system) as F-Values indicates statistical significance at 
1% level.  
 
The  period of our study was divided into 3 groups – (a) PREOM period (from 01-Jan-2003 to 
31-Jul-2005); (b) NDSOM – deals executed using the anonymous trading platform from 01-Aug-
2005 to 28-Feb-2013; (c) NDS – the OTC deals reported to RBI NDS system from 01-Aug-2005 
to 28-Feb-2013). We estimated the daily average ILLIQ ratio for each group. The results show 
clearly that the liquidity has improved after introduction of NDSOM in both OTC as well as in 
anonymous order driven market as the mean IILIQ in PREOM period was relatively higher vis-
à-vis the comparable values in post NDSOM. However, the volatility of ILLIQ has improved in 
NDSOM market but not in the OTC market. The results change quite significantly if we take 
only Government securities and drop other securities like T-Bills, SDLs, etc. The data for NDS-
OM falls short by 4 days as the representative trading was not available in NDS-OM platform 
due to technical and other reasons while OTC trades were reported in NDS platform by traders. 
When we consider all securities, we find that NDS-OM has marginally higher liquidity vis-à-vis 
NDS system in post-NDSOM era. The transparency in NDS-OM system helped the market 
participants to have better price discovery in OTC market.  
 
 Table -16: Amihud ILLIQUIDITY Indicators 
  GROUP DAYS Mean SDTDEV Skewness Kurtosis 
 All 
Securities 
PREOM 756 0.0023 0.0026 3.8507 22.1883 
NDS 1849 0.0017 0.0025 5.8015 56.5654 
NDSOM 1845 0.0016 0.0019 4.0139 23.9587 
 Only Dated 
Govt. 
Securities 
PREOM 756 0.0025 0.0029 4.1329 25.9236 
NDS 1847 0.0019 0.0030 5.8240 57.7065 
NDSOM 1845 0.0016 0.0020 3.9982 22.8242 
Non-Dated 
Government 
Securities 
PREOM 691 0.0011 0.0038 15.7713 319.5941 
NDS 1449 0.0010 0.0026 6.6321 60.8577 
NDSOM 989 0.0018 0.0046 6.5331 54.4018 
 
However, all the tests showed that there is a statistically significant difference between the mean 
of the variable Amihud ILLIQ and zero for all groups and it supports the relationship of price 
impact and liquidity.  
 
Annual average ILLIQ factor was estimated using the daily average ILLIQ for both NDS and 
NDSOM transactions for all securities from 01-Aug-2005 to 28-Feb-2013. In most of the years, 
ILLIQ factor for NDSOM has performed better vis-à-vis OTC NDS deals implying higher 
liquidity in NDSOM vis-à-vis OTC NDS market. However, only in the initial phase of NDS-OM 
(2005 & 2006), OTC NDS market had higher level of liquidity vis-à-vis NDS-OM. 
Table – 17: Year-wise Amihud ILLIQ Indicator for all Securities  
Year ILLIQ SDEV MAX MIN ILLIQ SDEV MAX MIN 
  PREOM   
  
  
  
2003 0.00268 0.00334 0.02736 0.00021 
2004 0.00225 0.00201 0.01941 0.00006 
2005 0.00172 0.00178 0.01047 0.00008 
  NDS Market (01-Aug-2005 onwards) NDSOM Market (01-Aug-2005 onwards) 
2005 0.00044 0.0003 0.00180 0.00007 0.00125 0.00158 0.01553 0.00014 
2006 0.00104 0.00113 0.00814 0.00002 0.00141 0.00123 0.00769 0.00005 
2007 0.00152 0.00304 0.04039 0.00000 0.00126 0.00133 0.01299 0.00008 
2008 0.00351 0.00414 0.02544 0.00005 0.00257 0.00273 0.02147 0.00010 
2009 0.00263 0.00326 0.03186 0.00016 0.00284 0.00302 0.01923 0.00000 
2010 0.00149 0.00133 0.00882 0.00008 0.00125 0.00132 0.00985 0.00009 
2011 0.00109 0.00101 0.00607 0.00003 0.00102 0.00112 0.01121 0.00004 
2012 0.00108 0.00098 0.00625 0.00003 0.00107 0.00092 0.00505 0.00011 
2013 0.00096 0.00074 0.00315 0.00005 0.00095 0.00048 0.00268 0.00026 
 
Since NDSOM trading platform accounts for a lion’s share in dated Government securities while 
major trading in SDL and T-bills are reported to NDS system, we estimated daily Amihud ILLIQ 
factor by taking only Government dated securities into account. The result shows that in 
Government securities, NDSOM significantly scores over trades reported in OTC NDS platform. 
And in recent years, the liquidity in NDS-OM platform has increased significantly vis-à-vis the 
OTC NDS market. 
 
 
 
Table – 18: Year-wise Amihud ILLIQ Indicator for Government  Securities  
Year ILLIQ SDEV MAX MIN ILLIQ SDEV MAX MIN 
  PREOM  
  
  
  
2003 0.00278 0.00369 0.03179 0.00018 
2004 0.00253 0.00230 0.02228 0.00007 
2005 0.00210 0.00217 0.01695 0.00006 
  NDS Market (01-Aug-2005 onwards) NDSOM Market (01-Aug-2005 onwards) 
Year ILLIQ SDEV MAX MIN ILLIQ SDEV MAX MIN 
2005 0.00054 0.00039 0.00259 0.00008 0.00124 0.00158 0.01553 0.00014 
2006 0.00126 0.00139 0.00840 0.00006 0.00138 0.00125 0.00794 0.00005 
2007 0.00191 0.00384 0.05030 0.00000 0.00127 0.00128 0.01299 0.00008 
2008 0.00414 0.00516 0.03134 0.00008 0.00259 0.00273 0.01702 0.00010 
2009 0.00275 0.00344 0.03170 0.00022 0.00296 0.00328 0.02171 0.00000 
2010 0.00153 0.00145 0.00882 0.00014 0.00119 0.00129 0.01108 0.00009 
2011 0.00126 0.00135 0.01185 0.00002 0.00100 0.00114 0.01239 0.00004 
2012 0.00118 0.00113 0.00692 0.00006 0.00100 0.00089 0.00505 0.00002 
2013 0.00100 0.00085 0.00354 0.00007 0.00078 0.00044 0.00211 0.00026 
 
We did a t-test (independent groups) to understand if the Amihud illiquidity factor is statistically 
different in their mean for NDS and NDSOM platforms (taking all data). This t-test is designed 
to compare means of same variable (Amihud ILLIQ) between two groups – NDS and 
NDSOM.  The p-value for the difference in means between NDS and NDS-OM is more than 
0.05 for the entire period, so we conclude that the difference in means is not statistically 
significantly different from 0.  However, for the F-test (two-tailed significance probability), the 
probability is less than 0.05. So there is evidence that the variances for the two groups, NDS and 
NDSOM, are different. Therefore, we report Satterthwaite variance estimator for the t-test. 
Satterthwaite is an alternative to the pooled-variance t-test and is used when the assumption that 
the two populations have equal variances seems unreasonable. It provides a t-statistic that 
asymptotically approaches a t distribution, allowing for an approximate t-test to be calculated 
when the population variances are not equal.  
 
The same t-test was extended to year-wise analysis. For 2005, 2006 and 2008, we find that the 
difference in means of the variable ILLIQ for both NDS and NDSOM are statistically and 
significantly different from 0 at 1% level and for 2010 the same is at 5% level. For other years, 
the p values are not significant and hence the difference in means for NDS and NDSOM is 
statistically 0. The transparency in NDSOM has helped to improve liquidity in OTC market in 
general. For 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2013, the F-test, p-values were significant at 1% evidencing 
that the variances for the two groups are different. For other years, the test statistics are not 
significant. 
Table – 19: t-test results for Year-wise Amihud ILLIQ Indicator for all Securities  
  Mean Procedure t-Test Results F-Test Results 
Sample Type N Mean Std Dev Std Err Method Variances DF 
t 
Value 
Pr > |t| Equality of Variances 
Full 
NDS 
1849 0.0017 0.0025 0.0001  
Method 
Num 
DF 
Den 
DF 
F 
Value 
Pr > F 
NDSOM 
1845 0.0016 0.0019 0.0000 Satterthwaite Unequal 3462.8 0.96 0.3346 
Folded F* 
1848 1844 1.7 <.0001 
Diff (1-2) 
 
0.0001 0.0022 0.0001 
  significant at 1% 
2005 
NDS 
113 0.000436 0.0003 0.000028  
Folded F* 
112 112 27.74 <.0001 
NDSOM 
113 0.00125 0.00158 0.000149 
Satterthwaite* Unequal 
120.06 -5.37 <.0001 
significant at 1% 
Diff (1-2) 
  -0.00081 0.00114 0.000151 
 significant at 1%           
2006 
NDS 
246 0.00104 0.00113 0.000072 
Pooled* Equal 
490 -3.52 0.0005 
Folded F 245 245 
1.18 0.1855 
NDSOM 
246 0.00141 0.00123 0.000078  
 
Diff (1-2) 
  -0.00037 0.00118 0.000107 
 significant at 1%   
2007 
NDS 
244 0.00152 0.00304 0.000194  
Folded F* 
243 243 5.17 <.0001 
NDSOM 
244 0.00126 0.00133 0.000085 
Satterthwaite Unequal 
333.54 1.21 0.2286 
significant at 1% 
Diff (1-2) 
  0.000256 0.00235 0.000212 
    
2008 
NDS 
240 0.00351 0.00414 0.000267  
Folded F* 
239 240 2.3 <.0001 
NDSOM 
241 0.00257 0.00273 0.000176 
Satterthwaite* Unequal 
413.79 2.95 0.0033 
significant at 1% 
Diff (1-2) 
  0.000945 0.00351 0.00032 
 significant at 1%   
2009 
NDS 
237 0.00263 0.00326 0.000212 
Pooled Equal 
472 -0.74 0.4607 
Folded F 236 236 
1.16 0.2538 
NDSOM 
237 0.00284 0.00302 0.000196    
   
Diff (1-2) 
  -0.00021 0.00314 0.000289 
    
2010 
NDS 
246 0.00149 0.00133 0.000085 
Pooled** Equal 
490 1.97 0.0492 
Folded F 
245 245 1.01 0.9139 
NDSOM 
246 0.00125 0.00132 0.000084  
 
Diff (1-2) 
 
0.000235 0.00132 0.000119 
 significant at 5%   
2011 
NDS 
240 0.00110 0.00101 0.000065 
Pooled Equal 
473 0.83 0.4054 
Folded F 
234 239 1.23 0.113 
NDSOM 
235 0.00102 0.00112 0.000073  
 
Diff (1-2) 
 
0.000081 0.00106 0.000097 
    
2012 
NDS 
242 0.00108 0.000977 0.000063 
Pooled Equal 
482 0.11 0.9152 
Folded F 
241 241 1.12 0.3681 
NDSOM 
242 0.00107 0.000922 0.000059  
 
Diff (1-2) 
 
0.00001 0.00095 0.000086 
    
2013 NDS 
41 0.000962 0.000738 0.000115  
Folded F* 
40 40 2.39 0.007 
NDSOM 
41 0.000949 0.000478 0.000075 
Satterthwaite Unequal 
68.489 0.09 0.9271   
significant at 1% 
Diff (1-2) 
 
0.000013 0.000622 0.000137 
  
 
 
We did the same set of tests with Amihud ILLIQ taking into account only Government securities 
and dropping T-Bills and other securities. The results are significantly different from the earlier 
one (with all securities). When we considered only dated Government securities, we find that for 
full period, the t-stat is significant at 1%. The p-value for the difference between NDS and NDS-
OM is less than 0.05 for the entire period, so we conclude that the difference in means is 
statistically significantly different from 0.  For the F-test (two-tailed significance probability), the 
probability is less than 0.05. So there is evidence that the variances for the two groups, NDS and 
NDSOM, are different. The same t-test was extended to year-wise analysis. For 2005, 2007, 
2008 and 2010 we find that the difference in means of the variable ILLIQ are statistically 
significantly different from 0 for both NDS and NDSOM at 1% level, for 2011 at 5% level and 
for 2012 at 10% level. For other years, the p values are not significant and hence the mean is 
statistically 0 for NDS and NDSOM. For 2005, 2007, 2008, 2011, 2012 and 2013, the F-test, p-
values were significant at 1% evidencing that the variances for the two groups are different. For 
2006 and 2010, the same is significant at 10%. For only 2009, the test statistics are not 
significant. Hence, NDSOM scores over NDS platform in term of liquidity when we consider 
only Government securities. 
Table – 20: t-test results for Year-wise Amihud ILLIQ Indicator for all Government Securities   
  Mean Procedure t-Test Results F-Test Results 
Full 
NDS 
1847 0.00189 0.00299 0.00007 
  
   Folded 
F* 
1846 1844 2.26 <.0001 
NDSOM 
1845 0.00158 0.00199 0.000046 
Satterthwaite* Unequal 
3211.3 3.67 0.0002 
significant at 1% 
Diff (1-2) 
 0.000307 0.00254 0.000084 
 significant at 1%   
2005 
NDS 
113 0.000539 0.000385 0.000036 
  
   Folded 
F* 
112 112 16.87 <.0001 
NDSOM 
113 0.00124 0.00158 0.000149 
Satterthwaite* Unequal 
125.23 -4.6 <.0001 
significant at 1% 
Diff (1-2) 
 -0.0007 0.00115 0.000153 
 significant at 1%   
2006 
NDS 
245 0.00126 0.00139 0.000089 
  
   Folded 
F* 
244 245 1.23 0.0998 
NDSOM 
246 0.00138 0.00125 0.00008 
Satterthwaite Unequal 
483.25 -0.98 0.3254 
significant at 10% 
Diff (1-2) 
 -0.00012 0.00132 0.000119 
    
2007 
NDS 
243 0.00191 0.00384 0.000246 
  
   Folded 
F* 
242 243 8.93 <.0001 
NDSOM 
244 0.00127 0.00128 0.000082 
Satterthwaite* Unequal 
295.32 2.46 0.0146 
significant at 1% 
Diff (1-2) 
 0.000638 0.00286 0.000259 
 significant at 1%   
2008 
NDS 
240 0.00414 0.00516 0.000333 
  
   Folded 
F* 
239 240 3.57 <.0001 
NDSOM 
241 0.00259 0.00273 0.000176 
Satterthwaite* Unequal 
362.92 4.12 <.0001 
significant at 1% 
Diff (1-2) 
 0.00155 0.00413 0.000376 
 significant at 1%   
2009 
NDS 
237 0.00275 0.00344 0.000223 
Pooled Equal 
472 -0.66 0.5083 Folded 
F 
236 236 1.1 0.4786 
NDSOM 
237 0.00296 0.00328 0.000213 
  
   
   
Diff (1-2) 
 -0.0002 0.00336 0.000309 
    
2010 
NDS 
246 0.00153 0.00145 0.000092 
  
   Folded 
F*** 
245 245 1.27 0.066 
NDSOM 
246 0.00119 0.00129 0.000082 
Satterthwaite* Unequal 
483.36 2.75 0.0062 
significant at 10% 
Diff (1-2) 
 0.00034 0.00137 0.000124 
 significant at 1%   
2011 
NDS 
240 0.00126 0.00135 0.000087 
  
   Folded 
F 
239 234 1.41 0.0084 
NDSOM 
235 0.001 0.00114 0.000074 
Satterthwaite** Unequal 
462.63 2.3 0.0219 
  
significant at 1% 
Diff (1-2) 
 0.000264 0.00125 0.000115 
 significant at 5% 
 
2012 
NDS 
242 0.00118 0.00113 0.000073 
  
   Folded 
F* 
241 241 1.63 0.0001 
NDSOM 
242 0.001 0.000886 0.000057 
Satterthwaite* Unequal 
455.55 1.92 0.055 
significant at 1% 
Diff (1-2) 
 0.000178 0.00102 0.000092 
 significant at 10%   
2013 
NDS 
41 0.001 0.000846 0.000132 
  
   Folded 
F* 
40 40 3.78 <.0001 
NDSOM 
41 0.000785 0.000435 0.000068 
Satterthwaite Unequal 
59.785 1.46 0.1494 
significant at 1% 
Diff (1-2) 
 0.000217 0.000673 0.000149 
    
 
As we have divided our trades into three different groups – liquid, semi-liquid and illiquid, we 
wanted to test if there is any difference in liquidity for the same group of securities in different 
platforms. We considered all securities for the analysis while calculating the Amihud ILLIQ 
factor. Pre-NDSOM era had remarkably higher illiquidity. 
Table – 21: Group-wise Amihud ILLIQ Indicator for all Securities  
    ILLIQUID LIQUID SEMI-LIQUID 
  Year ILLIQ SDEV MAX ILLIQ SDEV MAX ILLIQ SDEV MAX 
PREOM  
2003 0.0048 0.0060 0.0433 0.0011 0.0014 0.0134 0.0032 0.0054 0.0571 
2004 0.0038 0.0050 0.0581 0.0009 0.0009 0.0055 0.0020 0.0018 0.0095 
2005 0.0027 0.0040 0.0297 0.0006 0.0006 0.0036 0.0016 0.0018 0.0106 
NDS - 
POSTOM 
2005 0.0002 0.0003 0.0028 0.0010 0.0007 0.0033 0.0003 0.0005 0.0042 
2006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0030 0.0030 0.0030 0.0188 0.0004 0.0004 0.0022 
2007 0.0008 0.0012 0.0114 0.0064 0.0083 0.0630 0.0005 0.0008 0.0070 
2008 0.0013 0.0018 0.0110 0.0123 0.0153 0.0924 0.0013 0.0019 0.0166 
2009 0.0022 0.0028 0.0164 0.0071 0.0115 0.0822 0.0014 0.0019 0.0138 
2010 0.0017 0.0033 0.0370 0.0031 0.0032 0.0238 0.0006 0.0007 0.0035 
2011 0.0010 0.0013 0.0104 0.0026 0.0028 0.0149 0.0005 0.0005 0.0041 
2012 0.0012 0.0015 0.0145 0.0014 0.0019 0.0193 0.0007 0.0010 0.0071 
2013 0.0014 0.0013 0.0050 0.0011 0.0010 0.0050 0.0002 0.0002 0.0015 
NDSOM 
2005 0.0032 0.0054 0.0424 0.0005 0.0004 0.0025 0.0014 0.0017 0.0129 
2006 0.0035 0.0039 0.0333 0.0005 0.0005 0.0041 0.0020 0.0020 0.0129 
2007 0.0036 0.0055 0.0445 0.0005 0.0005 0.0043 0.0016 0.0020 0.0160 
2008 0.0061 0.0111 0.1167 0.0009 0.0011 0.0130 0.0029 0.0035 0.0226 
2009 0.0059 0.0083 0.0567 0.0011 0.0016 0.0136 0.0033 0.0035 0.0247 
2010 0.0036 0.0073 0.0867 0.0003 0.0003 0.0019 0.0015 0.0018 0.0179 
2011 0.0028 0.0037 0.0335 0.0003 0.0003 0.0018 0.0016 0.0027 0.0290 
2012 0.0026 0.0033 0.0327 0.0003 0.0003 0.0020 0.0013 0.0014 0.0114 
2013 0.0023 0.0014 0.0071 0.0002 0.0002 0.0014 0.0011 0.0010 0.0056 
 
A graphical representation of the data clearly shows that OTC deals reported to NDS platform 
has higher level of illiquidity for stocks classified as “Liquid” vis-à-vis securities classified as 
“Illiquid” or “Semi-liquid”22.  
 
       
We conducted similar analysis for dated Government securities and dropped all T-Bills, special 
and State securities.  
 
Table – 22: Group-wise Amihud ILLIQ Indicator for Government Securities  
    ILLIQUID LIQUID SEMI-LIQUID 
  Year ILLIQ SDEV MAX ILLIQ SDEV MAX ILLIQ SDEV MAX 
PREOM  
2003 0.0058 0.0079 0.0696 0.0011 0.0014 0.0134 0.0033 0.0058 0.0571 
2004 0.0049 0.0064 0.0811 0.0009 0.0009 0.0057 0.0024 0.0023 0.0189 
2005 0.0041 0.0056 0.0336 0.0006 0.0006 0.0036 0.0022 0.0023 0.0156 
NDS - 
POSTOM 
2005 0.0002 0.0003 0.0028 0.0010 0.0007 0.0033 0.0004 0.0007 0.0070 
2006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0035 0.0031 0.0030 0.0188 0.0005 0.0005 0.0039 
2007 0.0009 0.0013 0.0114 0.0067 0.0084 0.0630 0.0005 0.0009 0.0070 
2008 0.0013 0.0020 0.0109 0.0126 0.0154 0.0924 0.0015 0.0025 0.0201 
2009 0.0021 0.0031 0.0261 0.0076 0.0121 0.0822 0.0015 0.0019 0.0123 
                                                          
22 Illiq_L is for liquid securities; Illiq_IL if for illiquid securities and Illiq_sm is for Semi-liquid securities. 
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Chart - 4: NDS Platform - Amihud Illiquidity
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Chart - 5: NDSOM Platform - Amihud Illiquidity
ILLIQ_IL ILLIQ_L ILLIQ_SM
2010 0.0016 0.0034 0.0370 0.0033 0.0033 0.0238 0.0006 0.0007 0.0039 
2011 0.0013 0.0029 0.0316 0.0026 0.0028 0.0149 0.0005 0.0006 0.0041 
2012 0.0014 0.0017 0.0130 0.0015 0.0020 0.0193 0.0007 0.0011 0.0096 
2013 0.0015 0.0015 0.0059 0.0010 0.0010 0.0050 0.0002 0.0003 0.0015 
NDSOM 
2005 0.0032 0.0054 0.0424 0.0005 0.0004 0.0025 0.0014 0.0017 0.0129 
2006 0.0036 0.0044 0.0333 0.0005 0.0005 0.0041 0.0020 0.0021 0.0129 
2007 0.0043 0.0058 0.0445 0.0005 0.0005 0.0043 0.0019 0.0023 0.0160 
2008 0.0071 0.0129 0.1167 0.0009 0.0012 0.0130 0.0030 0.0036 0.0226 
2009 0.0069 0.0099 0.0675 0.0012 0.0016 0.0136 0.0037 0.0040 0.0247 
2010 0.0041 0.0081 0.0867 0.0003 0.0003 0.0019 0.0015 0.0016 0.0120 
2011 0.0037 0.0042 0.0335 0.0003 0.0003 0.0018 0.0018 0.0028 0.0290 
2012 0.0028 0.0028 0.0200 0.0003 0.0003 0.0020 0.0015 0.0015 0.0114 
2013 0.0023 0.0018 0.0093 0.0002 0.0002 0.0014 0.0012 0.0010 0.0056 
 
A graphical representation of the data clearly shows that OTC deals in dated Government 
securities reported to NDS platform has higher level of illiquidity for stocks classified as 
“Liquid” vis-à-vis securities classified as “Illiquid” or “Semi-liquid”.  
 
 
We estimated daily Amihud ILLIQ factor by taking only liquid securities into account. The 
result shows that the Amihud illiquidity factor is very low for liquid securities in NDS-OM 
platform.   
 
Table – 23: Amihud Illiquidity Indicator for Liquid Securities  
Year ILLIQ SDEV MAX MIN ILLIQ SDEV MAX MIN 
  PREOM         
2003 0.00117 0.00090 0.00320 0.00029         
2004 0.00088 0.00049 0.00197 0.00044         
2005 0.00059 0.00006 0.00068 0.00054         
  NDS Market NDSOM Market 
Year ILLIQ SDEV MAX MIN ILLIQ SDEV MAX MIN 
2005 0.00102 0.00022 0.00132 0.00079 0.00050 0.00014 0.00066 0.00034 
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Chart - 6: NDS Platform - Amihud Illiquidity (only G-Sec)
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Chart - 7: NDSOM Platform - Amihud Illiquidity (only G-
Sec)
ILLIQ_I ILLIQ_L ILLIQ_SL
2006 0.00303 0.00063 0.00416 0.00200 0.00050 0.00012 0.00072 0.00030 
2007 0.00626 0.00313 0.01400 0.00254 0.00051 0.00027 0.00110 0.00021 
2008 0.01233 0.00579 0.02270 0.00450 0.00094 0.00051 0.00197 0.00050 
2009 0.00693 0.00558 0.01748 0.00190 0.00115 0.00104 0.00361 0.00025 
2010 0.00307 0.00093 0.00446 0.00115 0.00032 0.00009 0.00053 0.00020 
2011 0.00265 0.00100 0.00415 0.00088 0.00033 0.00012 0.00062 0.00016 
2012 0.00140 0.00082 0.00356 0.00059 0.00029 0.00015 0.00056 0.00010 
2013 0.00104 0.00025 0.00121 0.00086 0.00024 0.00001 0.00025 0.00023 
 
We also estimated daily Amihud ILLIQ factor by taking only semi-liquid securities into account. 
The result shows that the Amihud illiquidity factor is very relatively high for semi-liquid 
securities in NDS-OM platform.   
 
Table – 24: Amihud Illiquidity Indicator for Semi-Liquid Securities   
Year ILLIQ SDEV MAX MIN ILLIQ SDEV MAX MIN 
  PREOM         
2003 0.00325 0.00315 0.01095 0.00067         
2004 0.00200 0.00080 0.00343 0.00099         
2005 0.00161 0.00056 0.00222 0.00082         
  NDS Market NDSOM Market 
Year ILLIQ SDEV MAX MIN ILLIQ SDEV MAX MIN 
2005 0.00035 0.00012 0.00055 0.00027 0.00147 0.00063 0.00242 0.00068 
2006 0.00040 0.00009 0.00057 0.00028 0.00195 0.00045 0.00308 0.00142 
2007 0.00050 0.00027 0.00103 0.00024 0.00168 0.00068 0.00275 0.00066 
2008 0.00128 0.00108 0.00418 0.00025 0.00290 0.00141 0.00635 0.00159 
2009 0.00140 0.00103 0.00429 0.00071 0.00330 0.00226 0.00839 0.00132 
2010 0.00059 0.00020 0.00096 0.00034 0.00144 0.00048 0.00233 0.00075 
2011 0.00046 0.00018 0.00093 0.00026 0.00160 0.00113 0.00496 0.00072 
2012 0.00069 0.00038 0.00139 0.00023 0.00129 0.00060 0.00246 0.00042 
2013 0.00017 0.00008 0.00023 0.00012 0.00111 0.00011 0.00119 0.00103 
 
We also estimated daily Amihud ILLIQ factor by taking only illiquid securities into account. The 
result shows that the Amihud illiquidity factor is very relatively high for illiquid securities in 
NDS-OM platform.   
 
 
 
able – 25: Amihud Illiquidity Indicator for Illiquid Securities  
Year ILLIQ SDEV MAX MIN ILLIQ SDEV MAX MIN 
  PREOM         
2003 0.00497 0.00382 0.01287 0.00140         
2004 0.00384 0.00162 0.00806 0.00184         
2005 0.00265 0.00074 0.00395 0.00188         
  NDS Market NDSOM Market 
Year ILLIQ SDEV MAX MIN ILLIQ SDEV MAX MIN 
2005 0.00017 0.00007 0.00027 0.00008 0.00326 0.00205 0.00621 0.00135 
2006 0.00046 0.00011 0.00064 0.00031 0.00347 0.00067 0.00445 0.00224 
2007 0.00081 0.00039 0.00150 0.00031 0.00387 0.00228 0.00798 0.00095 
2008 0.00130 0.00067 0.00288 0.00039 0.00609 0.00406 0.01580 0.00167 
2009 0.00219 0.00138 0.00608 0.00089 0.00589 0.00383 0.01470 0.00164 
2010 0.00167 0.00080 0.00315 0.00089 0.00358 0.00142 0.00587 0.00216 
2011 0.00094 0.00046 0.00195 0.00050 0.00268 0.00155 0.00742 0.00173 
2012 0.00124 0.00056 0.00205 0.00068 0.00261 0.00118 0.00483 0.00117 
2013 0.00141 0.00030 0.00162 0.00120 0.00230 0.00097 0.00299 0.00162 
 
It has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that NDS-OM has improved liquidity in the market 
and specifically, the on-the-run Government securities has very low Amihud ILLIQ factor. 
However, for illiquid and semi-liquid securities, NDS reporting platform provides higher level of 
liquidity vis-à-vis NDS-OM.  
 
Liquidity is generally a function of yield – high yield will force traders to avoid selling off their 
stocks and low yield will enthuse buyers to procure the stock. Change in Yield has an impact on 
liquidity measured by TR and Amihud ILLIQ. For this purpose, we only considered the data 
from Aug’05 to Feb’13 from NDS-OM system. As the NDS-OM system had anonymous order 
book system with exact time stamp, it was easy to record opening and closing price of the trades.  
 
Table – 26: Simple Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Sum Minimum Maximum Label 
DY 90 0.0081 0.2492 0.7311 -1.2167 0.7714 Change in Yield 
DI 90 -0.0005 0.1060 -0.0414 -0.5202 0.3519 Change in Amihud Illiquidity 
Indicator 
 
The change in yield and change in Amihud ILLIQ indicator had a negative correlation of 0.43 
indicating strong relationship.  
Chart - 8: Scatter Plot - Yield and Amihud ILLIQ (Monthly Changes) 
 
 
 
However, the relationship between Amihud ILLIQ and TR was weak with correlation coefficient 
of 0.20.  
Table – 27: Pearson Correlation Coefficients (Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0)  
Variables DY DI DT 
DY (Change in Benchmark yield) 1 -0.43 (<.0001) -0.44 (<.0001) 
DI (Change in Amihud Illiquidity Indicator) -0.43 (<.0001) 1 0.20 (0.065) 
DT  (Change in Turnover Ratio) -0.44 (<.0001)  0.20 (0.065) 1 
 
With Fisher’s z Transformation, the correlation coefficients show that there is a positive relation 
between liquidity indicators like Turnover Ratio and Amihud ILLIQ indicator but the same is 
significant only at 10% level. However, with respect to yield the liquidity indicators have strong 
negative relationships (significant at 1% level). 
 
In order to understand the true relation between Amihud ILLIQ and Yield, we fitted a simple 
model using Yield with the lagged values of Amihud ILLIQ . 
 
𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐷𝑌10𝑡 + 𝛾1 ∗ 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛾3 ∗ 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−2 + 𝛾3 ∗ 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−3 +  𝜀𝑡 
The results show that yield has a very significant role in the determination of liquidity in the 
market. The estimated equation shows that 10-year yield23 is statistically significant at 1% level 
with lagged values of Amihud ILLIQ being significant at 1% level (other lags were not 
significant). This result is in line with the TR test results.  
 
Table – 28: Parameter Estimates 
Variable DF Estimate 
Standard 
t Value 
Approx 
Variable Label 
Error Pr > |t| 
Intercept 1 0.0006 0.0094 0.06 0.9515   
DY 1 -0.1704 0.0375 -4.55 <.0001 Change in Benchmark Yield 
LI1 1 -0.4056 0.0932 -4.35 <.0001  Lag1 value of ILLIQ indicator 
LI2 1 -0.2750 0.0935 -2.94 0.0042 Lag2 value of ILLIQ indicator 
R-Sq – 0.35 Durbin’s h – (-0.94) (0.17 – p value) RMSE - 0.08784 * - significant at 1% and ** - significant at 10% level 
 
The signs of the estimated equation show clearly that liquidity measured by ILLIQ is negatively 
related to Yield. We used yield and the lag values of ILLIQ assuming that illiquidity of today has 
its root in the past – past illiquidity might affect present liquidity. We found that only first two 
lags of ILLIQ is statistically significant while other lags are not. This implies the illiquidity has a 
short memory.  
 
Impact Cost 
Impact Cost (IC) is another important measure of liquidity in the financial market where trading 
happens through an order book mechanism. In Indian Government bond market, NDS-OM 
provides the order book for securities trading in the system. Using the order book, we estimated 
impact cost for executing standard 250million (FV)24 worth of bond for both buy and sell side 
positions separately. IC is estimated for 5 most liquid bonds at every 30 minutes interval. We 
ignored semi-liquid and illiquid securities as it was difficult to get the orders filled for the 
required standard value. For some bonds on some days for some time intervals, the order book 
was not filled for standard execution and the hence IC was not estimated for that time slot for the 
security on that day. At the end of the day, IC was averaged for both bid and offer side separately 
                                                          
23 10 year yield is used as it represents the most liquid basket in India. 
24 Bonds are traded in Face Value (FV) 
and then averaged together for the day. The IC was estimated from 01-Aug-2006 to 30-Apr-
2013.  
 
The data shows that the average daily Bid IC is typically higher than the Offer IC. Bid IC is 
likely to be used by a trader having an open Buy position in the market – as she has an open buy 
position and would like to close the same; and if she has to take an offsetting sale deal to close 
out her open position, she will have to trade (take the price) with the price offered by a buyer 
(bidder). The Offer IC is likely to be used by a trader having an open Sale position. As the 
market data shows higher Bid IC vis-à-vis Offer IC, the market makers must be charging some 
premium for enabling sell of securities. This is plausible as most of the entities dealing in the 
market have excess holding of Government stocks – specifically banks having more securities 
holding than the Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) requirement of 23% of Net Demand and Time 
Liabilities (NDTL) at present and may have less appetite for holding more securities in their 
portfolio. However, the difference in the spread is not substantially large.  
Table – 29: Yearly Impact Cost (%) 
Year Days OFFER IC Bid IC Average IC Spread 
2006 85 0.043325 0.0513 0.0473 0.0080 
2007 235 0.0808 0.0907 0.0857 0.0099 
2008 235 0.1351 0.1480 0.1415 0.0129 
2009 233 0.2092 0.2186 0.2139 0.0094 
2010 232 0.1258 0.1267 0.1262 0.0009 
2011 234 0.0555 0.0596 0.0575 0.0041 
2012 238 0.0468 0.0522 0.0495 0.0054 
2013 77 0.0374 0.0480 0.0427 0.0106 
 
The average daily IC in 2006 was relatively lower. The onset of financial crisis in 2007 started 
liquidity problem in the market and hence the IC started moving up. It reached its record high in 
2009 – almost 4.5 times of 2006 level. After 2010, it started to fall and in 2013, the same is at its 
record low – close to 2006 level.  
 
 
 
                                                          
25 0.0433 means 0.0433% 
 Table – 29: Year-wise Daily Descriptive Statistics of Intra-day Impact Cost  (%) 
Year Days Params OFFER IC Bid IC 
Pre Midday 
Offer Pre Midday Bid 
Post Midday 
Offer Post Midday Bid 
2006 85 Mean 0.0433 0.0513 0.0425 0.0524 0.0439 0.0506 
    Std Dev 0.0153 0.0183 0.0162 0.0202 0.0169 0.0198 
    Max 0.0962 0.1364 0.1041 0.1277 0.1096 0.1421 
    Min 0.0193 0.0233 0.0203 0.0226 0.0160 0.0222 
2007 235 Mean 0.0808 0.0907 0.0779 0.0907 0.0826 0.0906 
    Std Dev 0.0389 0.0382 0.0379 0.0390 0.0436 0.0418 
    Max 0.2566 0.2368 0.2389 0.2348 0.3137 0.2835 
    Min 0.0221 0.0229 0.0178 0.0249 0.0182 0.0216 
2008 235 Mean 0.1351 0.1480 0.1400 0.1525 0.1324 0.1457 
    Std Dev 0.0994 0.1161 0.1264 0.1429 0.0933 0.1102 
    Max 0.7820 1.0351 1.0845 1.4070 0.6004 0.8120 
    Min 0.0285 0.0291 0.0204 0.0254 0.0323 0.0313 
2009 233 Mean 0.2092 0.2186 0.2089 0.2281 0.2104 0.2136 
    Std Dev 0.1464 0.1381 0.1502 0.1468 0.1585 0.1482 
    Max 1.2098 0.9751 0.9032 0.8198 1.4659 1.1397 
    Min 0.0283 0.0307 0.0184 0.0307 0.0275 0.0307 
2010 232 Mean 0.1258 0.1267 0.1249 0.1321 0.1265 0.1231 
    Std Dev 0.0977 0.0912 0.1081 0.1116 0.1018 0.0932 
    Max 0.5455 0.4583 0.6026 0.6566 0.6033 0.5873 
    Min 0.0179 0.0223 0.0169 0.0186 0.0190 0.0218 
2011 234 Mean 0.0555 0.0596 0.0545 0.0618 0.0561 0.0580 
    Std Dev 0.0253 0.0275 0.0293 0.0358 0.0263 0.0258 
    Max 0.1651 0.2123 0.2227 0.2887 0.1861 0.1783 
    Min 0.0202 0.0227 0.0173 0.0154 0.0194 0.0223 
2012 238 Mean 0.0468 0.0522 0.0485 0.0565 0.0457 0.0493 
    Std Dev 0.0212 0.0247 0.0247 0.0335 0.0214 0.0229 
    Max 0.1489 0.1849 0.1992 0.3469 0.1390 0.1806 
    Min 0.0132 0.0138 0.0105 0.0111 0.0150 0.0157 
2013 77 Mean 0.0374 0.0480 0.0387 0.0519 0.0366 0.0454 
    Std Dev 0.0129 0.0165 0.0157 0.0224 0.0129 0.0153 
    Max 0.0775 0.1045 0.0973 0.1267 0.0829 0.1123 
    Min 0.0172 0.0228 0.0160 0.0204 0.0180 0.0229 
 
The average IC in different periods – between 9.00AM and 12.30PM (Pre-Midday) and between 
1.00PM and 5.00PM (Post-Midday) show some variation. Typically IC in Post-Midday is higher 
than the Pre-Midday. As markets are very active in the morning, the market makers may possibly 
be demanding higher cost for executing deals.  
  
 
The difference between Bid IC and Offer IC represent the spread. The spread is generally 
positive as Bid IC has been generally higher than the Offer IC. The Bid IC was higher in about 
69% of the days (1569 days between 03-Aug-2006 and 30-Apr-2013). In case of Pre-Midday 
sessions, Bid IC was higher in case of 91% instances while in Post-Midday, the same was higher 
for about 75% of instances. 
 
Table 30: Descriptive Statistics of Impact Cost Spread (%) 
Average Spread Pre-Midday Spread Post-Midday Spread 
N 81 Sum Weights 81 N 81 Sum Weights 81 N 81 Sum Weights 81 
Mean 0.0074 Sum 
Observations 
0.5961 Mean 0.0113 Sum 
Observations 
0.9141 Mean 0.0048 Sum 
Observations 
0.3907 
Std 
Deviation 
0.0122 Variance 0.0001 Std 
Deviation 
0.0134 Variance 0.0002 Std 
Deviation 
0.0140 Variance 0.0002 
Skewness -0.0171 Kurtosis 1.7528 Skewness 0.6989 Kurtosis 3.2367 Skewness -0.2289 Kurtosis 3.2959 
Uncorrected 
SS 
0.0163 Corrected SS 0.0119 Uncorrected 
SS 
0.0246 Corrected SS 0.0143 Uncorrected 
SS 
0.0176 Corrected SS 0.0157 
Coeff 
Variation 
165.4767 Std Error 
Mean 
0.0014 Coeff 
Variation 
118.3747 Std Error 
Mean 
0.0015 Coeff 
Variation 
290.7277 Std Error 
Mean 
0.0016 
 
The variability of the spreads is stable except during the financial crisis period. However, the 
pre-Midday spread is generally higher in comparison to the post-midday spread.  
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Liquidity indicators like Impact Cost, Turnover Ratio and Amihud ILLIQ should rationally have 
direct relationship with the yield. Higher yield should indicate lower liquidity (hence higher 
impact cost and higher Amihud Illiquidity factor).  However, we found a very low correlation 
between change in yield and change in impact cost. The positive sign indicates high yiled is 
related to high impact cost (low liquidity). 
 
Chart - 12: Scatter Plot - Yield and Impact Cost (Monthly Changes) 
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We looked at a linear equation to understand the dependence of yield on impact cost. We did not 
find any significant relationship between them. However, we found that lagged values of Impact 
cost changes have some influence in the current impact cost. 
  
Price Volatility structure 
In order to understand the price volatility structure of the Government securities market, we 
analysed trading data from April 1999 to Feb 2013 (167 months of trade information). Two 
important market microstructure changes took place during these years– setting up a clearing and 
settlement system in Feb’02 and starting of an order driven trading system for Government debt 
in Aug’05. The volatility indicator has been computed as a ratio of price range and trade value 
for individual stocks on daily basis with the condition that the stock has at least 3 trades in a day. 
In some cases, we found that all trades have been executed at the same price in the OTC market 
and hence we dropped these trades assuming that it is likely that two traders might have agreed 
to deal at a particular price in an OTC market for specific reason and might have unbundled the 
deals into various lots as per their operational flexibility.   
 
Table 31: Descriptive statistics of Volatility Structures 
Mean 0.0031 
Standard Error 0.0002 
Median 0.0024 
Standard Deviation 0.0026 
Kurtosis 19.6340 
Skewness 3.7013 
Range 0.0213 
Minimum 0.0009 
Maximum 0.0222 
Sum 0.5199 
Count 167 
Confidence Level (95.0%) 0.0004 
  
The data shows that volatility indicator was higher before the introduction of structured clearing 
and settlement systems as well as before the introduction of NDSOM system in Government 
securities market. The same came down and became more stable afterwards. The volatility 
indicator was high during the financial crisis period (identified with RBI’s action for softening or 
hardening policy rates) but in recent months the same has been substantially lower. 
 An order driven system might have helped in reducing the volatility in the market because of its 
transparency level. Given the order book system and anonymous trade matching provisions 
coupled with straight through processing capabilities, the NDSOM could be used by the traders 
to execute deals with each other. Hence the new system could have brought some significant 
change to the entire environment. In order to understand the role of NDSOM system in volatility 
spectrum, we used a dummy variable for testing the same.  
 
The equation estimated is  
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 ∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡−1 + 𝛾 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦1 + 𝜏 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦2 + 𝜖𝑡 
 
Table 31: Parameter Estimates 
Variable Label DF 
Parameter Standard 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Estimate Error 
Intercept Intercept 1 0.0027* 0.00039 7.02 <.0001 
Lag (Vol) Lagged Value of Volatility Indicator 1 0.2683* 0.07511 3.57 0.0005 
DM1 DUMMY for NDSOM 1 -0.0013* 0.00041  -3.1 0.0022 
DM2 DUMMY for Financial Crisis 1 0.0019* 0.00058  3.27 0.0013 
R-Sq - 0.21, RMSE – 0.0023, DW stat – 2.03  
1st Order Autocorrelation = -0.017 
*Significant at 1% level 
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We used to dummy variables, one for introduction of NDSOM system in August’05 and the 
other one to control the effect of financial crisis Indian market experienced during 2008/2009. 
Both these dummies are significant at 1%.  
 
The volatility indicator in period t depends on the volatility indicator of period t-1 (we tried with 
other lags but found them to be not statistically significant). The dummy variables used became 
significant at 1% indicating that introduction of NDSOM system has an impact on volatility. As 
the sign is negative, the relation is inverse – the volatility indicator has come down after the 
introduction of NDSOM system; other dummy variable has the positive sign meaning that the 
higher volatility indicator was due to financial crisis.  
  
 
 
There seems to be a structural break in 2005 as the volatility structure is changing towards a 
lower level. This structural break is possibly due to introduction of NDSOM system in Indian 
Government securities market. In order to understand if there is a structural break in the volatility 
structure represented by volatility indicator after introduction of NDSOM, we conducted a Chow 
test for the said dataset. We also included lagged values of volatilities in the regression model.  
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Table – 32: Structural Change Test 
Test Break Point Num DF Den DF F Value Pr > F 
Chow 77 3 160 4.87 0.0029 
 
The Chow test clearly accepts the hypothesis that there was a structural break in volatility 
structure after introduction of NDS-OM 
 
Table – 33: Parameter Estimates 
Variable DF Estimate Standard 
Error 
t Value Approx 
Pr > |t| 
Variable Label 
Intercept 1 0.002691 0.000478 5.63 <.0001  
LV1 1 0.3439 0.0733 4.69 <.0001 Lag 1 Value of Volatility Indicator 
Time 1 -7.605E-6 3.9609E-6 -1.92 0.0566  
R Sq - 0.16, DW Stat – 2.07 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The study finds that Turnover Ratio and Amihud Illiquidity indicator are important market 
liquidity indicators for Indian sovereign bond market. Though, impact cost is used as an indicator 
for liquidity, the same does not have an explanatory relationship with yield. It has been found 
that NDS-OM system has helped in improving liquidity in the system substantially. It has also 
helped in reducing volatility in the market to a large extent. 
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